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FREEDOM: OF EXPRESSION AND SECURITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THE FUNCTION OF THE SUPREME COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
AND INDIA. By A. S. Bedi. New York: Asia Publishing House. 1967.
Pp. xiv, 483. $7.75.

An element of weakness in American constitutional law is the
traditional unwillingness of bench and bar to profit from the experience of other law cultures. This is as tragic as it is unnecessary.
There are countries from which it is most natural to learn lessons
of comparative constitutional law. Thus, much can be gained from
the countries that share our heritage of gaining independence from
the British Empire and then adopting a written constitution with a
jural bill of rights. Moreover, we can profit from the experience of
nations, like the Philippines, which drafted constitutions patterned
in large part after the American organic acts.
Of the first group of countries mentioned, Australia and India
immediately come to mind. At a time when congressional acts of
doubtful constitutionality remain vital because the Supreme Court
has denied standing to sue to all potential plaintiffs, we must at
least seek to understand the success of Australia's practice of giving
the attorney general of each state standing to attack as unconstitutional any legislation of the federal government. Again, when judgments of a state court are still treated as foreign country obligations
in neighboring states, we should attempt to appreciate the more
intelligent and satisfying response within the Australian federal
system.
Indian courts, perhaps more than the courts of any other
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. country, have avidly looked to American constitutional law precedents for guidance. The opinion in practically every important case
is liberally sprinkled with references to American decisions and
authors, as are the standard Indian texts on constitutional law.
The book under review is in keeping with this healthy tradition,
and, in addition, offers a novel perspective to the American constitutional lawyer.
An American reader may suspect that the author's primary
intention was to serve the advancement of Indian constitutional
jurisprudence, which is, of course, an altogether worthy objective.
He has mastered the American common law, its constitutional
debates, the accumulated gloss of a century and three-quarters, and
the available literature in a way never before accomplished by a
foreign scholar. As the title indicates, the book is limited to one
aspect of comparative constitutional law: the reconciliation of
society's interest in freedom of communication with state security
needs. The author has performed a truly inestimable service in
providing a masterful, objective, and complete study of the American experience for his Indian colleagues. He has seen our difficulties,
our problems, our inadequacies, and our needs, and, while treating
our institutions and jurists with respect and sympathy, has unfolded
for readers, not only in India but everywhere, the unwisdom of
constitutionalizing such things as seeming absolutes and twenty
dollar specifics.
The American reader may be disappointed by the relative
paucity of Indian materials (about 100 pages out of 450). Much of
the Indian experience which would prove valuable to American
lawyers is not included in the book. For example, the United States
Supreme Court has never expressly declared that legislative negations or restrictions of the fundamental freedoms are presumed
to be unconstitutional. Apparently, respectable Indian jurists have
made such statements. It would greatly help American scholars to
be told whether such a presumption has in fact been applied in the
free expression area in India, and with what results. Similarly, no
American lawyer has been able to persuade the United States
Supreme Court to invalidate state legislative restrictions on freedom
of expression solely on the ground that a more reasonable alternative
is available to the state. 1 If peddlers of milk are entitled to such
treatment under the commerce clause,2 surely peddlers of ideas are
entitled to comparable judicial protection under the first amendment. In India it appears that the courts can invalidate legislation
imperiling fundamental freedoms when a reasonable alternative
is available-that is, when the restriction is more onerous than
1. Cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
2. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
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the situation demands. 3 The American legal community would be
interested in learning the results of the application of this rule.
Traditional Indian constitutional jurisprudence looks upon preventive detention as an interference with freedom of movement, and
thus the author is justified in not approaching this as a first amendment problem. Yet American legal scholars would be likely to consider this an aspect of freedom of association, and once again would
have relished an extended treatment by a scholar of the magnitude
and experience of Dr. Bedi. Another omission is the failure to deal
with the constitutional right to remain silent. Although the table
of cases lists the Barenblatt,4 Braden, 5 and Wilkinson 6 cases, there
appears to be no systematized critique of these decisions. American
readers would be interested in knowing the types of security cases
in which India recognizes a constitutional right of silence grounded
upon freedom of speech.
The author occasionally succumbs to the notion that society's
interest in security is opposed to the individual's interest in freedom
to speak. This may be forgivable, since the United States Supreme
Court itself has accepted such a view. What is really involved of
course (as the Court has many times been told) is a reconciliation
of two legitimate societal interests: freedom of communication and
state security. One is also left rather unenlightened as to the philosophy and methodology of the Indian Supreme Court and the state
courts. It would be interesting to know whether Indian jurists are
operating under notions of natural rights, neo-realism, or contemporary pragmatism.
Dr. Bedi has seen that there are problems of federalism inherent
in constitutional adjudication in the freedom of expression context,
and this is rare for both American and foreign scholars. Whether
or not American solutions are entirely desirable, his identification
of the problem will inevitably be of service to the Indian legal
community. Indeed, the entire book is filled with helpful insights
into the problems we have faced over the last tvva centuries. It is
useful for any American Ia-wyer or jurist to see these problems
through the eyes of a detached and sympathetic scholar who is
altogether fair in his critique of our institutions, our rules, and our
jurists.
Against the single criticism that the American audience does not
get enough of Dr. Bedi there must be placed the careful, complete,
and critical research and writing that have gone into this fine and
scholarly work. The subtleties, the nuances, and the unarticulated
3. 1 A. CHAUDRI, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIMITATIONS 461 (1955). See also
Chintamanrao v. State, 1951 India S. Ct. 118.
4. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
5. Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
6. Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
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premises of our jurisprudence are fully captured by this great
scholar who has done us a double service in giving us both a new and
critical look at our constitutional law and a candid, comparative
look at Indian responses to similar problems. Dr. Bedi has ·written in
his second language with beautiful style, force, and clarity. We can
look forward to further works in comparative constitutional law by
this imaginative and expressive international scholar.
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